

These propositions are not "demonstrated"

INSERT X

(still hesitant to accept these propositions, ~~and dubious~~ as precise and accurate, rather than

A still-dubious reader will not find "evidence"

then

the propositions above "demonstrated" in the

essays that follow, which deal very little

with history. This book is not a substitute for

(in this respect, Vol. I of the
reading the Pentagon Papers themselves & or the
Bacon Press edition)

other historical works cited above. There

is scarcely any other reading I could recommend

so near high for its bearing on current policy

problems of negotiating "reasonable" negotiating
positions" ^{versus} the urgency of terminating ^{American} ~~over~~

killings violence in Indochina.

C

Such conclusions challenged most of the premises by which my professional career had been guided. As a whole, the Pentagon Papers confirmed for me

Along with its implications for the illegitimacy of our policy and the urgency of ~~such~~ ^{changing} it, the Pentagon Papers revealed to me that the President was part of the problem, and ~~and this was clearly a matter of role, not personality or party.~~ ^{along with this, the} The concentration of power with the Executive since World War II had focused nearly all responsibility for "failure" upon one ~~man~~ ^{man} the ~~human~~ ^{man} being, the President; and at the same time, it gave him ^{enormous} the capability to avert or postpone that failure, or conceal that failure by ~~any means~~ ^{any means} by violence and deception. That power could not fail. Confronted by resistance, as in Vietnam, that power could not fail to corrupt the human officeholder.

To read the continuous record of intelligence estimates from 1946 on is finally

D
to lose the delusion that better-informing the President is the key to ending the war.

Only if power were brought to bear upon the Executive branch ^(perhaps, otherwise it) ~~with the sharing of~~ ^{resulting "losses"} ~~for~~ ^{resulting "failures"} broadly the responsibility for ~~the~~ ^{resulting "failures"} ~~the~~ ^{resulting "failures"} rigid the policy of stalemated - rather - than - "failure" be edge moved. "Inside" consulting, as in the

— with the important secondary effect of sharing responsibility ^{for events} ~~more~~ ^{more} broadly ~~pressing~~ ^{pressing} on the Executive

normal RAND pattern, at ^{best} ~~not~~ contributed to the pattern of inordinate, ^(unbalanced) Executive power that led ~~to~~ directly to its ^{rigid, yet} desperate, lawless behavior.

~~But~~ ^{But} ~~to~~ ^{to} ask a man who has spent his professional life serving the Executive to act

Opposing truth to power
Setting truth against power

on such perceptions is asking him to jump
out of his skin. Something harder than
making it:

^{which}
~~Risking~~ it I had done, along with ~~most~~
recently, some three million ^{younger} Americans
who had gone to Vietnam. That we had seen
as serving the President; ~~and~~ until recently,
few of us supposed that ^{might conflict}
with serving our country. * ~~It was it helped me to~~
~~At first this point I forgot~~
example of some other young Americans, faced
with the same choice — and perhaps with less to
unlearn than I had — to help me to pick
in myself, and to act on, loyalties long unconsulted,

* Richard Neustadt's 1961 book, Presidential Power

() had had great intellectual influence on
me ~~in the early~~ though most of the 'sixties (it was said to
be a handbook in the Kennedy White House). Its message, on
the problems of Presidential control over policy ~~at~~

Q
with the setting of intra-Executive "bureaucratic politics,"
~~bureaucracy~~, could be paraphrased, in the terms of
the previous Administration: "What's good for the
President is good for the country." It took
Vietnam, and the Pentagon Papers, to jar me loose
from that ^{notion} ~~conception~~.

~~deeper and broader than loyalty to the
President: loyalty to our founding concepts,
to countrymen, to one's own humanity.~~

What was needed at ^{now} this point in our
history ^(— for many in my position —) was the inspiration to find in oneself
loyalties long unconsulted, deeper and broader
than loyalty to the President: loyalties to our
founding concepts, to countrymen, to one's own
humanity. ~~And at this very point in~~
~~my own history~~ life, it was the example
of ^{some} ~~all~~ young Americans. It was other
young Americans who provided me that

6
example. That same month of August, 1969
that I read the origins of the war in the
Pentagon Papers, I met, face-to-face,
Americans who were on their way to prison,
rather than to cooperate with a coercive
draft ~~that was~~ sending Americans to an unjust
war. They were sober, intelligent, principled; I ~~th~~
saw, in fact, the same dedication I had respected
~~some officials, not in many I had known -~~
~~in my family - and myself - in Vietnam,~~
acting on different premises. ~~It was their conviction~~
~~was by later choices~~ Their "witness"
This personal acts of "witness" gave me
what reading alone could not.

In that month and the next, friends
left in the Government in Washington and Vietnam
revealed to me, in disappointments,
that the Administration had President Nixon
had made his choice from among the "options"
I had helped draft at the end of 1968.

and his choice was not extrication, a definite end to our involvement. Once now an Administration planned to postpone failure, to buy time ~~at the price of our safety~~ ^{undefinable} ~~or our independence~~ maintained by maintaining American troops (~~to~~ very gradually reduced to a sizeable residual force), American bombing, ~~and~~ ^{and} submarine casualties, and the threat of worse. Only Congress and the public, better informed and organized in protest, could now ~~perhaps~~ dissuade the President from thus proclaiming "Nixon's War"; ~~that~~ ^{that} course before he committed himself to it publicly, or before a year in office had ~~passed~~ ^{elapsed} ~~created~~ ^{created} ~~this~~ ^{this} created the image of "Nixon's War" by default, condemning us all to it for at least three more years.

4

In October, I joined five colleagues at RAND in the first statement, ^{on Vietnam} addressed to the public I had ever written, a letter to the New York Times calling for U.S. unilateral withdrawal. At the same time in ~~addition~~, of course, to my colleagues at RAND in the Executive branch, I acted to reveal the information in the Pentagon, ^{Papers} first to ~~the~~ Congress and ~~public~~ through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

As it worked out, nearly twenty months went by before the ~~public~~ information finally reached the public and the rest of Congress. (or, for that matter, the Executive). ~~It since I was unsuccessful in persuading the White House or State Department to set up the own "lesson learning" studies of the Papers in 1970 or early '71,~~ which had till then totally neglected to unlock and study its own copies).

It had become painfully clear that Congress, too, was part of the problem; and I finally set out to inform the sovereign public, through the "fourth branch of government," the press.

(as informants had foreseen,

Meanwhile, two more invasions had taken place; another ———— bomb had fallen; nearly 10,000 more Americans had died, and hundreds of thousands of Indo-Chinese. ~~And over now,~~ ^{still} ~~after this disclosure,~~ ^{eight months later,} the war survivors, ^{still} endlessly "ending," will be buying peanuts at the rate of World War II and heavy raids over ~~over the North Atlantic~~.

"John McAlister's book is amazing,"
Cyrus Vance ^{told} ~~said to me~~ in early 1971,
at a party as we went ^{in to hear} ~~to~~ a private
"background" by Henry Kissinger at a party
outside Cambridge. "If only we had had it
in the mid-'sixties!" I would ~~have~~ liked to
believe that a book could have made a difference
~~in the~~ ^{in the} ~~Def~~ ^{in the} ~~Evolution~~ ^{the};
to us then & But it was available now, say to
Henry Kissinger (along with the ^{(White House copy of} ~~Pentagon Papers~~, which I
had urged him, unsuccessfully, to read, or to
assign to some assistant, in September 1970).

Get ^{the} word Kissinger tell us that evening,
"We are ending the war..."
"The war is trending down, and I assure you that"

it will continue to "thud down" ^{that night}, ^{thence}, we
learned the next ^{morning} ~~day~~ ^{That the} ~~the night of~~ ~~begin~~
the pre-invasion bombing of Laos had begun
as ~~as~~ ~~the~~ ~~in~~ ~~was~~ ~~he~~ ~~was~~ ~~speaking~~.

Will the Pentagon Papers in the hands of
the public have greater effects or not?
Or is it possible that the American people, too,
~~perhaps not~~

~~It is~~ ~~possible~~ ~~that~~ ~~they~~ ~~will~~ ~~not~~.
are part of the problem; that our values,
fears, obedience, weld us all into the
Stalwart Machine: that we are the problem
for much of the rest of the world?

It is too soon to say ^{that} ~~that~~ ^{There is too much} ~~The~~ information to
be absorbed ~~into~~ from the Pentagon Papers and
the disclosures and analyses that are beginning
to follow; ^{too many} ~~the~~ myths and lies to be unlearned;
~~the~~ habits to be changed in a public that
^{too many}

✓
let its sovereignty in foreign affairs atrophy
for 30 years • ~~if there are too great to~~
~~allow one~~

Still, one cannot be sure. There are times
when ^{it seems} ~~one cannot~~ that efforts to ~~understand~~ the
Stalin Machine ~~have been simply~~ ^{have & simply} ~~understanding~~
efforts to end the war are as quixotic as
any earlier efforts to help win it. • ~~that the~~ ^{moving from one side to the other of a truly true}
~~Stalin Machine is as resistant to pressure from~~
~~one side to the other~~ ^{Stalin Machine?}
That is, after all, the implication
of ~~the~~ ^a concept explored in the following essays,
the Stalin Machine: by its nature, ^(it is) ~~as resistant~~
to pressure from one direction as the other.
I have & recently, only imagined an American
that "could" change itself to abandon
~~counter-revolution and~~ ^{without its own} ~~revise~~ ^{revise} in Vietnam (and
elsewhere), as once I imagined the American
and Saigon governments that could master it?

That is ~~a~~ "radical" ~~degree~~ position.



M

It is, ~~finally~~, up to us. ~~The~~ Machine, if there is one, is made of men ^{and women}, ~~and~~ ^{of} ~~human~~ habits, ~~relationships~~, ^{and} ~~relationships~~ ^{relationships}, that can be unmade by them ^{and these men and women can change.}

With knowledge and faith, men and women can free themselves from untruths, from killing ~~the~~ machines, from this war.

that they have made or maintained, and that can be unmade by them. ^{get} To be ~~the~~ radical

is to go to roots; and in Dwight MacDonald's ^(the title of) ~~essay~~ ^{essay} on our building of cities in World War II; "The root is man." ~~The~~

Knowledge is available ~~with which~~ Americans, men and women, ~~can~~ free themselves and those other victims from American untruths, from ~~killing~~ ~~machines~~, from our ^{longest} war.

In releasing the Pentagon Papers, I acted

~~I have acted~~, ~~with~~, ~~in the~~ ~~presence~~, ~~as~~ ~~finally~~,

in the hope that ~~the~~ ^{information} ~~knowledge~~ and ~~personal~~ ~~examples~~

that changed ~~the~~ ^{me} ~~can~~ help ~~the~~ ^{could} other

truths